创业与商业steveblank.com
创业公司股票期权：为什么一笔好交易变坏了
Startup Stock Options – Why a Good Deal Has Gone Bad
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导读
Steve Blank 2019 年的文章讨论创业公司员工股票期权为何从曾经的好交易变成坏交易，涉及行权成本、税务负担、流动性差和员工信息不对称等问题。评论区用真实案例补充：期权可能被重组转移、创始人可提前套现而员工难以卖出、普通员工按设计就拿不到多少价值。
为什么经久不衰：它经久不衰，是因为揭开了创业公司期权激励中员工承担不对称风险的结构性问题，今天科技从业者仍普遍面对。
HN 评论精选
早期员工在重组中被转移到债务壳公司，股票价值大减。
我曾是某知名孵化器的一员，也是一家旗舰公司的很早的员工。创始人烧了大量现金、造成多次稀释，但这是其中的一部分，我并不介意。真正道德上可疑的是，在我工作4年、期权已归属后离职不久，他们决定重组整个公司以吸引投资。他们把原公司的所有债务放进一家壳公司，这家壳公司再持有新公司的一部分。猜猜早期员工的股票去了哪里？去了那个债务载体。我最终退出时确实赚了一些钱，但大概比我的股票如果在新公司里会少一到两个数量级。考虑到我们打造的技术是那次收购的主要驱动力，这很令人沮丧。人都是贪婪的，无论他们当面对你多好。
MobileVet查看英文原文
I was part of a very well know incubator and a very early employee at a flagship company. Founder blew tons of cash and dilutions but that is part of it and I didn’t mind. What was ethically shady was shortly after I left with 4yrs vested they decided to restructure the entire company so they could attract investment. They took all the debt from the original company and put that in a shell company that then owned a portion of the new company. Guess where early employees’ stock went? The debt vehicle. I actually did make some money on the eventual exit, but probably 1 or 2 orders of magnitude off of what it would have been if my stock was in NewCo. Consider the tech we built was a major driver of the acquisition, it was frustrating. People are greedy, no matter how nice they are to your face.
创业公司期权实际回报常为零甚至负，维权成本高。
我在大型成熟公司通过 ISO（激励性股票期权）赚了不少钱。我从创业公司股票期权上赚到的却是零（其实是负的），甚至在2000年代事情变得很诡诈之前就是如此。我离开的一家创业公司如今已是十亿美元公司，但在我辞职几年后，他们干脆决定“消灭”我买下的股份。我可能被骗了，但不值得费力气去追讨，而他们知道这一点。把创业公司期权当作废纸。你可能走运，但真的非常非常不可能。
kabdib查看英文原文
I made a bunch of money from ISOs at large, established companies. I made zero (well, negative, really) from startup stock options, even before things got really shifty in the 2000s. One startup that I left, that is now a billion dollar company, simply decided to "extinguish" the shares I bought a few years after I resigned. I was probably cheated, but it's not worth the effort to go after them and they know it. Treat startup options as wastepaper. You might get lucky, but it's really, really unlikely.
创始人可提前套现而员工难卖股，流动性不平等是核心问题。
他轻描淡写了一个重要点：现在创始人作为融资轮的一部分套现很常见，有时早在A轮就开始了。创始人会要求把套现作为融资轮的条件，而投资顶级创业公司的竞争如此激烈，VC会同意。几十年前并非如此。创始人像员工一样等到IPO。如果你是一名工程师，在一家十角兽公司有500万美元已归属股票，卖出部分在财务上是合理的。今天，公司让这件事变得非常难。如果员工能在创业公司仍非上市时轻松卖出股票，这会解决很多问题。
thesausageking查看英文原文
He glosses over an important point: it's now typical for founders to take money off the table as part of financing rounds, sometimes as early as the A round. Founders will request it as part of a funding round and, there's so much competition to invest in the top startups, that VCs go along with it. Decades ago, this wasn't the case. Founders waited for the IPO like employees. If you're an engineer sitting on $5m of vested stock in a decacorn, it makes financial sense to sell some of it. Today, companies make that really hard to do. If employees could easily sell their stock while the startup is still private, this would solve a lot of the problems.
期权要求员工先承担行权和税务风险，且普通员工缺乏议价能力。
文章说得对，但漏掉了期权最大的问题：为了有机会拿到任何回报，你得先花可能永远拿不回来的钱。这发生在两种情况下：你4年后离开公司，有30-90天行权。行权要花2万美元。公司离退出还很远。你行不行权？行权时，NSO 会立即产生税单，ISO 则会被 AMT 坑。你可能仅仅因为离职前公司拿到很高的409A估值，就突然欠国税局钱。而流动性事件遥遥无期。你加入一家付薪低、成功概率小的初创公司，已经是一场巨大赌博。你苦干多年、克服巨大困难让公司活下来。但离开时，国税局和公司却要你拿辛苦赚来的现金做最后一次赌博。我曾是起草期权协议的律师，后来在两家创业公司做早期员工。这个问题之所以没人提，是因为员工不知道自己签的是什么。期权按设计就值不了多少钱。除非你是前5名员工，否则没有筹码谈更好的条件。
aiisahik查看英文原文
The article is right but misses the biggest problem with options: the need to spend money you may never get back in order to have a chance to be paid anything. There are two ways this happens: - You leave the company after 4 years and have 30-90 days to exercise. The exercise will cost you $20,000. The company is nowhere near an exit. Do you do it? - When you exercise you are either immediately hit with a tax bill for NSOs or you get screwed on AMT with ISOs. You suddenly owe money to the IRS simply because the company received a very high 409A valuation just before you left. A liquidity event is nowhere in sight. You've taken a huge gamble by joining a fledgling company that pays little with a low probability of success. You toil for years an overcome tremendous odds to just keep the company alive. But now when you leave the IRS and the company itself wants you to take a final gamble with your hard earned cash. I used to be an attorney who drafted option agreements. Now I've been at two startups as early employees. The reason why this never comes up is because employees do not know what they are getting themselves into. The options are worth very little BY DESIGN. Unless you are among the first 5 hires, you will have no leverage to negotiate a better deal.
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