安全与隐私thoughtcrime.org编辑精选
我们都应该有需要隐藏的东西
We Should All Have Something To Hide
2013 — 2016，它一次次回到首页
黑点是上首页（≥ 50 分）的那次投稿，空心点是没冲上去的投稿，点越大分数越高。
导读
这是 Moxie Marlinspike 的一篇隐私辩护文章，回应“我没做亏心事，没什么可隐藏”的说法。文章讨论全面监控与完美执法为何危险：它不只针对坏人，还会压缩社会改变不义法律的空间，并让普通人在自动化执法下变得脆弱。
为什么经久不衰：它把隐私争论从“你是否有罪”提升到“社会如何避免被完美监控冻结”，在摄像头、数据平台和自动化执法更普及的今天更值得重读。
HN 评论精选
完美执法会固化不义法律，使社会无法通过“违法”实践推动改革。
想象一个反乌托邦的平行现实：执法百分之百有效，任何潜在违法者都知道自己会立刻被识别、逮捕和监禁。如果明尼苏达、科罗拉多和华盛顿自1850年代建州以来一直如此，最近这些变化几乎不可能发生。如果没人用过大麻，人们怎么能决定大麻应该合法？如果没人见过或参与过同性关系，各州怎么能决定允许同性婚姻？这句话说一千遍都不够。
coldtea查看英文原文
"""Imagine if there were an alternate dystopian reality where law enforcement was 100% effective, such that any potential law offenders knew they would be immediately identified, apprehended, and jailed. If perfect law enforcement had been a reality in MN, CO, and WA since their founding in the 1850s, it seems quite unlikely that these recent changes would have ever come to pass. How could people have decided that marijuana should be legal, if nobody had ever used it? How could states decide that same sex marriage should be permitted, if nobody had ever seen or participated in a same sex relationship?""" This, a thousand times this. I was struck with the same idea in the past. Law should not be 100% enforced, or it will be a dystopia. I wouldn't want to live in a world were the Grateful Dead couldn't do any drugs, teenagers could never drink a beer, nobody could express himself with a graffiti in a drab wall, no child that wants to be a graphic designer could ever pirate Photoshop, being a few months less or more than the legal age to date sends you off as a molester, playing a different region DVD lands you to jail, and a million other things...
随身设备使位置监控普及，可能仅因靠近犯罪现场就被怀疑。
谢谢 Moxie 的文章！我一直喜欢读你的东西。我认为很多人相信“我没什么可隐藏的”，这很可悲。我真正想知道的是你某种程度上提到的一点：几乎每个人身上都带着 GPS 追踪设备。我认为未来某天，仅仅出现在犯罪现场附近就足以让你成为嫌疑人，这并非不可能。也许这已经发生了。
druiid查看英文原文
Thanks for the post Moxie! I always enjoy reading your stuff (and have you subscribed in my RSS feed). I think it's sad that many believe they 'have nothing to hide'. I've already seen it expressed online in response to things others have posted. I think one thing I really wonder about that you somewhat touch upon is the fact that nearly everyone is carrying upon their person a GPS tracking device. I believe it not impossible the day will come where simply being in the area where a crime occurred is enough to open you to suspicion. Perhaps this has already happened.
应强调监控数据库会沦为打压异见工具，并需历史滥用案例支撑。
已有几种论证用来反驳政府索取我们数据的宣传。Moxie 提出一个尚未普及的论证：要改革不义法律，人们必须能够违反这些法律。这反对让政府拥有全知信息，因为那会让执法完美，从而使某些不义法律永久化。我认为这是论证的薄弱处——从信息全知到完美执法之间有巨大鸿沟。相反，我会把论证引向：每个公民犯罪行为数据库会成为压制异见的完美工具。任何在政治上变得碍事的人，其记录都会被翻查，生活被毁。我们需要一份详细记录历史上政府滥用数据的参考资料，关注数据如何收集、原始目的、收集者的善意，以及数据如何从收集它的政府流向滥用它的政府。
awakeasleep查看英文原文
There are a couple different arguments that have been developed to counter the government requests/propaganda for access to our data. Here, Moxie works on one I don't think has been popularized yet- To reform unjust laws, people must be able to break those laws. That is an argument against allowing the government to have total information awareness, because that access would allow the government to enforce laws perfectly, which would make some unjust laws permanent. I believe that is the weak bit of the argument- although it's true, there is a big gap between how the government could move from information awareness to perfect enforcement. Instead, I'd take the argument in the direction that a database of the criminal behavior on every citizen would create the prefect tool for the suppression of dissent. Anyone who became politically inconvenient would have their entries combed for wrongdoing, and their life destroyed. The weakness with THAT argument is that it assumes a conspiratorial, immoral federal government. Many of us may be able to imagine that, but it's an idea at the periphery of the Overton window. Which brings me to my point. We need a reference detailing historic government abuses of data. It should focus on: How data was collected The original purpose of collection The benign intentions of the original collectors How the data moved from the collecting administration to the abusive administration It seems like there should be a wealth of historical examples. What data did the Stasi have, Mao's china, the purges of intellectuals in russia and SE Asia. I bet there are even records of Torquemada's Inquisition. I want us to make the posibility of a good administration collecting data, and then that data being captured or inherited by a bad administration, a part of the mental vocabulary of the US population. Yeah it's ambitious, but I think that is the best chance we have at fighting the Government here. And, I believe that an earnest civil servant could understand the danger, and want to limit his own power, once this was properly explained.
自动化执法会让普通人因轻微违法被大规模起诉，隐私是必要平衡。
大多数人在一年里都犯过几项重罪，只是不知道或不在乎。一旦起诉变得像车牌扫描器每天开出数百张罚单一样自动化，他们就会希望自己多一点隐私，以平衡政府的过度干预。问题在于我们给执法部门极其强大的武器，而当追查真正的大罪犯太难时，他们就把目光转向容易抓的普通人，普通人几乎没有防御手段，只是为了犯罪预防数字在预算里好看。
ck2查看英文原文
Most people have committed a few felonies this year and either don't even know it or don't care. Once prosecuting people becomes as automated as a license plate scanner generating hundreds of tickets per day, suddenly they are going to wish they had a little more privacy to balance the government being overbearing. The problem is we give incredibly powerful weapons (both literally and figuratively) to law enforcement and then when going after the real big criminals turns out to be too difficult, they turn their eyes to the easy to catch regular folks with little way to defend themselves, just so crime prevention figures can look good in the budgets.
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