创业与商业theverge.com
Uber 破坏 Lyft 的战术手册
Uber's playbook for sabotaging Lyft
2014 — 2016，它一次次回到首页
黑点是上首页（≥ 50 分）的那次投稿，空心点是没冲上去的投稿，点越大分数越高。
导读
The Verge 2014 年曝光的 Uber 内部文件，展示了其针对竞争对手 Lyft 的系统性破坏策略：用一次性手机和虚假账户批量联系 Lyft 司机并试图挖角，同时通过大量叫车干扰 Lyft 运营。该文在 2014 和 2016 年两度登上 Hacker News 首页，成为 Uber 激进竞争文化的标志性报道。
为什么经久不衰：它记录了硅谷“增长至上”文化的典型样本，是理解平台垄断与反竞争商业伦理的经典案例，至今仍有警示意义。
HN 评论精选
Uber 早已不是弱者，巨额资本加持下的“颠覆者”叙事掩盖了其反竞争与剥削行为。
我一直很困惑 Uber 怎么能长期维持“弱者”形象。他们从高盛、贝莱德、TPG、KPCB、谷歌和贝索斯等顶级机构融资超过 15 亿美元——当这些资本都在押注你的成功时，你就不再是弱者了。他们手头的现金可能比他们要“颠覆”的整个出租车行业还多，却多次被抓到破坏竞争对手、虚假宣传，并屡被指控敌视自家司机。他们以对抗出租车利益集团为名，无视合理监管（比如每周最长工时和保险要求——你希望司机每周开 90 小时还没有责任险吗？）。推动坏法律改变需要“推力”，Uber 提供了很多，但并非所有限制商业的法律都是坏的，也并非所有违反坏法律的公司都是好的。
mikeyouse查看英文原文
I've been mystified how Uber's kept up their "Underdog" mantle for as long as they have. They've raised over $1.5B in investment from some of the biggest companies, private equity firms, and VCs on earth. I think you stop being an underdog as soon as Goldman Sachs, Blackrock, TPG, KPCB, Google, and Jeff Bezos are invested in your success. They likely have more cash-on-hand than the cumulative Taxi base they are 'disrupting', they've been caught multiple times sabotaging competitors, they've been outed for dishonest advertising, and have been repeatedly accused of hostile actions toward their drivers. They ignore sensible regulations like maximum hourly workweeks and insurance minimums (do you want your driver working 90hrs/week without liability insurance?) under the guise of fighting the taxi cartel. It often takes a 'push' to get bad laws changed, and Uber's provided much of that push, but not all laws that restrain business are bad and not all companies that break bad laws are good.
曝光的破坏手段适得其反，促使消费者转向 Lyft，并质疑投资方的知情与责任。
我知道这听起来可能夸张，但我希望更多人今天就去装上 Lyft 应用。之前我觉得它太小不值得关注，但如果 Uber 都感到威胁，那我也许该试试。在这件事以及几个月前 Uber 对 GoTaxi 的类似操作之后，我很乐意把生意转到别处。我也想知道投资 Uber 的风投是否知晓这些手段——想到好的创业投资被用来欺诈竞争对手而不是投入客户服务，实在令人遗憾。
untog查看英文原文
I know this may sound hyperbolic, but I hope that others join me in finally getting around to installing the Lyft app today. Before now I'd considered them too small to be worth bothering with, but hey, if Uber is worried then maybe I should give it a try. After this, and Uber's attempts at doing the same with GoTaxi a few months ago, I'll be very happy to take my business elsewhere. I'd also be interested to know if the VCs that invested in Uber were aware of these tactics. It's especially sad to think of good startup investment money being used to defraud a competing company rather than invest in good customer service.
澄清文章实际内容是挖角而非假单，并质疑社区对竞争手段的评判是否双重标准。
评论前请先读原文。这不是 Lyft 上月指控的“Uber 下假单让司机空跑”，而是：1) Uber 利用 Lyft 服务联系其司机，试图以更高报酬挖角；2) Lyft 试图屏蔽 Uber 承包商使用其平台以阻止挖角；3) Uber 用一次性手机和假账户继续挖角。另外想想过去一年苹果、谷歌等合谋压低科技员工薪资引发的愤怒——区别只是合谋与对抗性竞争吗？还是大家的立场取决于自己是否从中获利？
cmsmith查看英文原文
Please be sure to read this article before commenting. It is NOT about Uber ordering fake Lyft rides to keep Lyft drivers off the street, as was alleged by Lyft last month. It is about: 1. Uber using the Lyft service to get in touch with Lyft drivers, then trying to recruit them to be Uber drivers by presumably paying them more 2. Lyft trying to block Uber contractors from using Lyft, so that they cannot do (1) 3. Uber using burner phones and fake Lyft accounts to enable them to keep doing (1) Also keep in mind the uproar here over the past year caused by Apple/Google/etc trying to increase profits by subverting the free market for tech worker salaries. Is the only difference that then it was collusion as opposed to an adversarial arms race? Or does the collective opinion depend on whether HN readers stand to benefit financially?
诉诸破坏手段反而暴露 Uber 产品优势不足，其领先地位难以持久。
在我看来， resorting 到这种手段恰恰说明 Uber 相对竞争对手并没有多大优势。乘客偏好 Uber 的通常原因是更容易叫到车、更可靠，但别人很快也会赶上。值得注意的是，在出租车服务口碑较好的地方（如伦敦），Uber 的渗透远不如旧金山或纽约。
pcrh查看英文原文
To me, the need to resort to such tactics indicates that Uber doesn't have a very big advantage over its competitors. The usual reason passengers seem to prefer Uber is their easier availability and greater reliability. Others will catch on to this soon enough. It is also notable that in places with a better reputation for taxi services, such as in London, Uber's inroads have not been as great as they have been in SF or NY.
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