创业与商业paulgraham.com编辑精选
为什么创始人做个好人是安全的（Paul Graham）
Why It's Safe for Founders to Be Nice
2015 — 2017，它一次次回到首页
黑点是上首页（≥ 50 分）的那次投稿，空心点是没冲上去的投稿，点越大分数越高。
导读
Paul Graham 的经典短文，论证创始人保持友善是安全的：创业公司的成功靠增长而非压榨他人，高利润率行业里不必靠狠劲取胜，善待员工、客户和竞争对手反而更有利。文章也承认这一结论可能因行业利润率不同而变化。
为什么经久不衰：它把'善良是否吃亏'这个创业者的常见焦虑拆解成利润率和增长逻辑问题，结论至今仍被反复引用和争论。
HN 评论精选
友善策略的适用性取决于行业利润率，薄利行业天然催生残酷行为
我认为这取决于行业（PG 也推测过）。在软件等利润率高的行业行得通，但在薄利行业你会看到更多残酷行为。亚马逊工作条件差并非巧合——零售一直是薄利生意，缺乏利润迫使公司控制成本、追求效率，从而导致恶劣的工作条件和被解读为'狠'的决策。利润率很可能是工作条件的一个很好的指标。
rgbrenner查看英文原文
I think this depends on the industry (as PG speculated). It works in software and other industries with healthy margins. But in industries with slim margins, you see more cutthroat behavior. I don't think it's a coincidence that Amazon (for ex) has poor working conditions. Retail has always been a slim-margin business, and most of the companies in it are accused of very similar poor behavior. (I don't mean to pick on Amazon, but it's a recent example. And I know some will say AWS is ok.. but AWS likely has much higher margins than the retail side.. so it does't really change my point.) Take any industry.. and the chances are the profit margin is a good indicator of the working conditions. This isn't to mean that those who start retail (or similar low margin) business are mean people.. but I think the lack of profits necessitates cost control and a focus on efficiency... which leads to poor working conditions (since good working conditions cost money) and decisions people will interpret as mean.
用 Uber 等反例质疑 PG 关于增长不依赖狠劲的论断
我喜欢读 PG 的文章，但这篇需要更多检验：'创业公司的增长通常不依赖狠劲'是否属实？Groupon、Uber、Airbnb 等公司为提高增长率做过在我看来相当狠的事。我们听说的都是成功的公司，需要用那些很快失败的公司来检验这个命题。
tokenadult查看英文原文
I like to read pg's essays (they are what drew me to HN), but this one needs more examination of whether the statement "Obviously one case where it would help to be rapacious is when growth depends on that. What makes startups different is that usually it doesn't" is really true or not. Some of what I have read in news articles linked to from HN suggests that, say, Groupon or Uber or Airbnb or a variety of other startup businesses may all have done things that look rather rapacious to me to raise their growth rate. Some of those companies are still doing well, and some less so, but the companies we hear about here are all doing better than the companies started the same year that we never hear about, so we need to test pg's proposition by looking at startups that fizzle out soon after they are founded. Perhaps the highest level of niceness is found among companies that never gain high growth rate at all.
预留客户安抚预算让公司能始终以善意应对，效果很好
我们公司每月预算一小笔安抚客户的资金，可用于折扣、加急配送、升级等。这样每次客服回复都能以同理心开场，而不是先想着自保。结果是专注的工作环境、满意的客户、没有倦怠，也提醒我们通过持续改进产品来保持这种状态。
louprado查看英文原文
My company budgets a small amount for customer appeasement each month. The funds can be used toward discounts, expedited shipping, upgrades, etc. We can usually start every support response with empathy as opposed to protecting ourselves from loss. The result is a focused work environment, happy customers, no burn-out, no venting, no therapy bills, and a reminder to keep things this way by continuously improving the product(s).
企业级交易和专业服务领域需要更强势的谈判，友善策略不适用
这对早期企业级交易的创业公司不完全适用。如果谈判时'太不狠'，你可能资金枯竭、被客户忽视，被迫变成咨询公司。这不是滥用权力，而是把公司利益放在首位：不做混蛋，但要果断，有体面的备选方案、愿意走人。我完全同意 PG 对消费级或低边际成本产品的说法，但对专业服务绝对不同意。关键可能在于边际成本，而不只是增长曲线。
rdl查看英文原文
This doesn't apply completely, IMO, to startups with early enterprise deals. If you negotiate those in ways which are "too un-rapacious", you can be starved for capital, be ignored by the customer (because it's insignificant as an expense...), and turn into a consultancy by necessity. It's not exactly being power-mad, but definitely putting the interests of your company (which, at the time, might just be you!) first in negotiations. Not being a dick, but being assertive, and having a decent BATNA in negotiations (i.e. being willing to walk away). I'd totally agree with what pg said here for consumer or low-marginal-cost products. Absolutely disagree for professional services. Disagree moderately for the somewhat-marginal-cost world of enterprise deals (or hardware). I think there's something more to this which has to do with marginal cost, not just growth curve.
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